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Context and Objectives
Adressed questions
1 What do INDCs mean? And what might be the economic impacts of INDC
implementation?
2 How an international carbon market might affect climate agreements?
3 How to share additional efforts on 2015-2050 to reach the 2oC target in 2100?
How to design a fair agreement among groups of countries?
4 How each country will use its allocations on the horizon 2015-2050? What will
be the associated costs for each country?
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Meta-games for climate negotiations
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The payoff (welfare loss) of player j at equilibrium satisfies :
min
ωj

T−1∑
t=0
β
t
j (pi
t
j (e
t
j (Ω
t ))− pt (Ωt )(ωtj − etj (Ωt )))
 ,
subject to actions chosen by the other players and under the budget
sharing constraint
T−1∑
t=0
ω
t
j ≤ θjBud.
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Abatement cost functions pi are estimated through statistical emulation on a large set of
GEMINI-E3 simulations
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A noncooperative meta-game approach
Input Global budget Bud and allocations among countries (i.e., θj )
Model Minimize the economic impacts for each country by deciding:
1 How to use the budget on the horizon
2 Permit sales and buyings on the trading market
Output Emissions, Permit exchanges, Permit prices, Percentage of welfare losses, ...
⇒ By testing different allocations, one can find a fair burden sharing. For example if
we adopt a Rawlsian approach to distributive justice, the optimal game design
problem consists in finding the θj ’s in such a way that one minimizes the largest
welfare loss among the countries.
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Estimation of the abatement cost functions
We use the CGE model GEMINI-E3 as a the provider of data for the estimation
of the abatement cost functions for each group of countries
Estimations are based on statistical emulations of a sample of 200 GEMINI-E3
numerical simulations (4 periods ×11 = nb estimations)
The abatement costs are polynomial functions of degree 4 in the country
abatement level
ACj(t) = αj1(t) qj(t) + α
j
2 qj(t)
2 + αj3(t) qj(t)
3 + αj4(t) qj(t)
4. (1)
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INDCs evaluation
INDC analysis and consolidation
Difficulties to convert INDCs in consistent emissions abatements in 2030:
Objectives are related to different reference emissions (Historical emissions,
BAU emissions, Intensity target, etc)
Conditional and unconditional targets
Objective year: from 2025 to 2035
Missing information and unsubmitted INDCs
⇒We use conventional target related to GEMINI-E3 BAU scenario.
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INDC targets in Mt CO2-eq in 2030
Unconditional Conditional Reduction compared to GEMINI-E3 BAU
USA 4’045 3’796 -47%
EUR 3’230 3’230 -25%
UMB 2’510 2’499 -14%
CHI 17’748 15’860 0%
IND 6’681 6’482 0%
RUS 2’649 2’473 -1%
OPE 3’834 3’456 -2%
ROW 3’688 3’465 -13%
ASI 5’491 4’975 0%
LAT 4’245 4’059 0%
LDC 4’713 4’423 0%
World 58’833 54’718
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INDCs impacts on welfare losses on [2015, 2030]
Without International carbon market With International carbon market
Welfare loss CO2 prices in $ /t Welfare loss CO2 prices in $ /t
in % of disc. HC 2020 2030 in % of disc. HC 2020 2030
USA 0.37 53 71 0.08 3.6 5
EUR 0.02 27 36 -0.01 3.6 5
UMB 0.03 7 10 0.03 3.6 5
CHI -0.09 - - -0.11 3.6 5
IND 0.01 - - -0.02 3.6 5
RUS -0.03 - - -0.07 3.6 5
OPE 0.10 - - 0.06 3.6 5
ROW 0.03 2 3 0.03 3.6 5
ASI -0.02 - - -0.03 3.6 5
LAT -0.01 - - -0.02 3.6 5
LDC -0.08 - - -0.11 3.6 5
World 0.08 0.04
International carbon market has a positive impact on global and all individual
costs.
Low welfare losses clearly reflect a lack of ambition of INDCs.
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Decomposition of welfare losses
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Emissions budget on 2015-2050
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Global welfare loss on 2015-2050
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Different coalitions agreements (2oC target)
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Examples of fair agreement (2oC target) on [2015,
2050]
Equalized-WL agreement Adjusted-WL agreement
Region Emissions budget in Welfare loss Emissions budget in Welfare loss
Mt CO2-eq % of BAU emi. in % of DHC Mt CO2-eq % of BAU emi. in % of DHC
USA 166852 64 0.8 153046 59 0.9
EUR 80240 52 0.8 69620 45 0.9
UMB 63602 63 0.8 56640 56 0.9
CHI 264910 52 0.8 273760 54 0.5
IND 73986 55 0.8 76346 57 0.5
RUS 57230 67 0.8 58882 69 0.5
OPE 100890 76 0.8 103250 78 0.5
ROW 101480 65 0.8 105020 67 0.5
ASI 105020 65 0.8 109150 67 0.5
LAT 86730 72 0.8 90270 74 0.5
LDC 79060 79 0.8 84016 84 0.0
World 1,180,000 62 0.8 1,180,000 62 0.8
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Fair agreements for additional efforts
WL decomposition for Equalized-WL and Adjusted-WL
agreements
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Conclusion
Conclusion and Perspectives
Conclusion
INDCs commitments are weak.
It is possible to design fair agreements (eg, equalizing welfare costs between
coalitions)
The implementation of a tradable permits market is crucial as it allows to
equalize marginal abatement costs and to reduce welfare losses
Perspectives
Extend the model to robust optimization to take into consideration statistical
errors in the calibration of abatement cost functions
Apply meta-game on alternative economic models
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